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Assessing	Next	Generation	EU
The	unprecedented	fiscal	package	adopted	by	the	European	Council	this	summer	–	dubbed	Next	Generation	EU	–
is	vital	for	the	recovery	of	the	euro	area,	write	Lorenzo	Codogno	and	Paul	van	den	Noord.	However,	they
estimate	that	the	creation	of	a	Eurobond	and	permanent	fiscal	capacity	at	the	centre	would	have	been	a	more
powerful	means	to	mitigate	the	impact	of	the	crisis.
The	magnitude	of	the	Covid-19	shock	to	economic	activity	in	the	Eurozone	and	elsewhere	is	unprecedented	in	post
war	history.	The	OECD,	for	instance,	currently	expects	the	Eurozone	economy	to	shrink	by	7.9%	in	2020,	almost
twice	the	contraction	in	2009.	Yet	the	macroeconomic	policy	responses	have	been	equally	unprecedented,	both	at
the	national	and	pan-European	levels.	Most	significantly,	the	Covid-19	pandemic	finally	broke	the	taboo	on	a	pan-
European	fiscal	policy,	dubbed	‘Next	Generation	EU’.
Although	the	programme	is	not	yet	finalised,	it	is	set	to	contain	the	following	elements.	The	bulk	of	the	fiscal
expansion	is	provided	in	the	form	of	grants	and	loans	to	member	states	by	the	Recovery	and	Resiliency	Facility
(RRF)	amounting	to	€312.5	and	€360	billion,	respectively,	summing	up	to	roughly	5%	of	EU	GDP.	While	the	exact
formulas	are	still	under	discussion,	the	intention	is	to	spread	out	the	transfers	over	the	years	2021	to	2025,	with	the
onus	of	the	support	on	those	countries	that	have	been	hit	the	most	by	the	crisis.	Alongside	the	RRF,	member	states
would	receive	€77.5	billion	under	a	range	of	other	programmes,	such	as	‘ReactEU’	and	the	Just	Transition	Fund.
Using	conservative	assumptions	on	the	multiplier	effects,	we	estimate	the	impact	on	Eurozone	economic	growth	to
be	a	cumulative	1.5%	by	2023	and	3.0%	by	2027	(Figure	1).	Most	of	this	will	benefit	the	Eurozone	periphery,	where
the	cumulative	effect	could	be	as	large	as	4%	by	2023	and	well	over	8%	in	2027.1	While	impressive	enough,	this	is
excluding	the	impact	of	a	range	of	other	–	national	and	supranational	–	policy	initiatives	that	need	to	be	taken	into
consideration	as	well.	This	will	tell	us	whether	or	not	Next	Generation	EU	is	indeed	the	game-changer	it	is	intended
to	be,	or	not.
We	use	a	stylised	macroeconomic	model	developed	in	a	recent	paper	that	is	aimed	at	capturing	the	cumulative
impact	of	policy	change	over	the	medium	run.	We	proceed	in	two	steps,	broadly	reflecting	the	chronology	of	events.
First,	we	look	at	both	the	national	and	pan-European	fiscal	responses	(e.g.	SURE)	which	were	primarily	shaped
during	the	initial	stages	of	the	outbreak	and	the	associated	lockdowns	in	the	spring,	as	well	as	the	ECB’s	monetary
policy	response.	Next,	we	add	in	the	impact	of	Next	Generation	EU.
Figure	1:	Next	Generation	EU	–	estimated	cumulative	impact	on	real	GDP
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Source:	European	Commission,	European	Council,	authors’	own	calculations.
Finally,	we	compare	these	policy	responses	to	a	hypothetical	case	in	which	an	alternative	macroeconomic	policy
and	governance	framework	is	assumed	along	the	lines	of	our	paper.	Specifically,	we	assume	(i)	a	single	Eurobond
to	replace	national	bonds	on	banks’	balance	sheets	so	as	to	break	the	link	between	banking	and	sovereign	distress,
(ii)	Eurozone	fiscal	capacity,	including	automatic	stabilisers	and	discretionary	(but	rules-based)	policy,	and	(iii)	a
new	quantitative	easing	(QE)	scheme	that	mandates	the	ECB	to	purchase	Eurobonds	(while	national	sovereigns
lose	QE	eligibility	and	those	still	on	the	ECB’s	balance	sheet	are	swapped	for	Eurobonds	as	well).
All	simulations	assume	that	the	core	and	the	periphery	are	hit	by	an	adverse	demand	shock	of	respectively	-10%
and	-15%	of	GDP	and	an	adverse	supply	shock	of	respectively	-5%	and	-7.5%	of	GDP.	This	is	obviously	a	very
crude	gauge	of	the	Covid-19	shock,	and	views	are	bound	to	evolve	as	information	flows	in.	Also,	we	assume	a
favourable	risk	premium	shock	of	-200	bps	in	the	core	–	and	hence	an	equivalent	shock	to	the	spread	–	due	to	a
flight	to	safety	(this	is	aside	from	the	endogenous	change	in	the	spread	in	response	to	the	changes	in	debt
positions).
Actual	policy
Table	1	reports	the	computed	changes	in	main	aggregates	and	policy	variables	in	the	core,	periphery	and	euro	area
at	large.	The	first	column,	labelled	‘I’,	shows	the	combined	impact	of:
1.	Monetary	policy	stimulus	consisting	of	a	sustained	25bp	cut	in	the	policy	rate2	and	asset	purchases
amounting	to	12.3%	of	GDP	per	annum	sustained	for	two	years.3	We	also	assume	an	exogenous	cut	in	the
periphery	yield	by	200	bps	over	and	above	the	impact	of	the	ECB’s	asset	purchases	to	reflect	the	availability	of
a	new	ESM	credit	line	(though	this	may	never	be	used	for	various	reasons).
2.	Fiscal	stimulus	amounting	to	5.2%	of	GDP	in	the	core	and	3.2%	of	GDP	in	the	periphery.4	Besides,	we	factor
in	a	range	of	pan-EU	measures	adopted	in	the	spring,	such	as	React	EU,	that	involve	fiscal	stimulus	of	the
order	0.4%	of	GDP	in	the	core	and	0.8%	in	the	periphery.
Table	1:	Shock-responses
Note:	Scenarios	refer	to:	I	=	National	fiscal	responses	+	SURE	+	ESM	credit	line	+	monetary	policy,	 II	=	I	+	‘Next	Generation	EU’,	III	=	Safe	asset	+	permanent	fiscal
capacity.
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Column	II	of	the	table	reports	the	computed	outcomes	of	the	actual	policy,	including	the	impact	of	Next	Generation
EU.	Specifically,	while	leaving	all	other	assumptions	unchanged,	it	is	assumed	additionally	that:
1.	Grants	are	allocated	under	the	Recovery	and	Resilience	Facility	to	the	tune	of	1.0%	of	local	GDP	in	the	core
and	4.5%	of	local	GDP	in	the	periphery.	As	a	result,	the	increase	in	the	primary	deficit	at	the	centre	would
average	around	3.5%	of	euro	area	GDP.
2.	Loans	are	allocated	to	the	tune	of	0.4%	of	local	GDP	in	the	core	and	6.7%	of	local	GDP	in	the	periphery.
This	leaves	the	primary	deficit	at	the	centre	unaffected	(loans	are	below	the	line).	Still,	it	does	have	an	impact
on	EU-debt	(and	a	corresponding	issuance	of	common	bonds)	of	an	additional	3.5%	of	Eurozone	GDP.
3.	About	20%	of	the	above	Next	Generation	EU	package	is	assumed	to	be	used	for	funding	of	existing	national
measures,	which	therefore	would	reduce	the	national	fiscal	stimulus	accordingly.
The	main	results	of	the	simulation	can	be	summarised	as	follows:
1.	The	contraction	of	output	is	considerably	smaller	(-1.5%)	with	much	less	divergence	between	the	core	and
periphery.	The	widening	yield	spread	would	be	neutralised	as	well,	while	bank	credit	would	not	shrink.	So,	the
package	would	be	quite	effective	according	to	our	stylised	model.
2.	On	the	fiscal	side,	we	see	the	primary	deficits	at	the	national	level	still	increasing	substantially	by	6%	of	GDP
in	the	core	and	3.5%	of	GDP	in	the	periphery.	Yet,	especially	in	the	periphery,	this	is	a	much	smaller	increase
than	in	scenario	I,	helped	by	the	more	favourable	macroeconomic	environment,	the	less	prevalent	automatic
fiscal	stabilisers	and	the	use	of	transfers	from	the	centre	to	fund	national	programmes.	The	same	holds	for	the
public	debt	position.
Policy	response	with	a	safe	asset	and	fiscal	capacity
Scenario	III	reported	in	Table	1	is	based	on	the	following	assumptions:
1.	We	maintain	all	national	policy	measures	as	well	as	the	creation	of	the	ESM	credit	line	as	assumed	in
scenarios	I	and	II.	We	also	assume	the	supranational	fiscal	stimulus	(both	loans	and	grants)	on	aggregate	to	be
the	same	as	in	scenario	II,	but	instead	with	the	fiscal	stimulus	used	to	fund	pan-European	(as	opposed	to
national)	programmes	and	projects.	The	rationale	for	this	choice	is	to	avoid	the	crowding	out	of	national
spending	programmes.	We	also	slash	the	asset	purchases	by	the	ECB	by	half.
2.	Alongside	discretionary	fiscal	expansion	at	the	centre,	we	assume	supranational	automatic	fiscal	stabilisers
to	cater	for	some	horizontal	redistribution.	This	could	be	the	result	of	a	centralised	unemployment	insurance	or
re-insurance	scheme	or	the	creation	of	a	rules-based	European	buffer	fund,	for	example.	Specifically,	we
assume	that	for	every	1	percentage	point	contraction	in	national	GDP,	an	automatic	transfer	of	0.2	percentage
points	of	national	GDP	would	occur.	This	transfer	replaces	equivalent	national	automatic	stabilisers	to	provide
genuine	fiscal	relief.
3.	We	assume	that	a	safe	asset	(the	same	common	bond	that	is	issued	to	raise	money	for	fiscal	stimulus	at	the
centre)	is	created	before	the	pandemic	and	swapped	for	national	sovereigns	on	banks’	balance	sheets	to
remove	the	bank-sovereign	doom	loop.	We	also	assume	that	only	the	safe	asset	has	been	made	eligible	for
purchases	by	the	ECB.	Hence	all	asset	purchases	carried	out	by	the	ECB	in	this	scenario	refer	to	purchases	of
the	safe	asset	(in	the	secondary	market).
The	main	results	can	be	summarised	as	follows:
1.	The	aggregate	stabilisation	is	more	potent	than	in	scenario	II,	though	this	is	entirely	attributable	to	the
stabilisation	of	output	in	the	core.	This	is	not	surprising	given	the	absence	of	(discretionary)	fiscal	transfers.	Yet
the	periphery	is	not	(much)	worse	off	relative	to	scenario	II.	Even	so,	the	yield	spread	widens	somewhat	relative
to	scenario	II,	reflecting	the	absence	of	sovereign	debt	purchases	by	the	ECB,	but	without	affecting	bank
lending	as	the	doom	loop	is	broken.
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2.	The	fiscal-monetary	policy	mix	has	shifted	towards	the	former,	with	the	aggregate	fiscal	deficit	at	the	centre
widening	more	than	in	scenario	II	–	as	the	supranational	automatic	stabilisers	kick	in	–	and	the	asset	purchases
halved.	Since	the	ECB	would	purchase	the	common	bond	only,	its	yield	is	now	disconnected	from	the	national
yields	and	falls	relative	to	them.
All	in	all,	with	a	safe	asset	and	a	(partly	rules-based)	fiscal	capacity,	more	of	the	pandemic	shock	would	have	been
absorbed,	with	less	quantitative	easing	needed.	Moreover,	the	asset	purchases	would	be	directed	to	the	safe	asset
rather	than	national	sovereigns	and	hence	avoid	the	political	conflict	this	could	entail	and	the	need	to	keep	the
purchases	in	check	with	the	capital	key.	The	current	policy	response	could	be	seen	as	a	second-best,	i.e.	a	less
efficient	way	to	respond	to	an	economic	shock,	although	still	powerful,	if	not	vital.	This	exercise	shows	that	it	would
be	worthwhile	considering	a	more	permanent	macroeconomic	stabilisation	mechanism	in	the	future.
	
Notes
1.	The	‘core’	includes	Belgium,	Germany,	France,	Netherlands,	Austria,	Finland,	Luxembourg,	and,	for	the	purpose	of	this	exercise	also	Estonia	and	Ireland.	All	other
Eurozone	countries	are	included	in	the	periphery.
2.	This	refers	to	the	PELTROs	which	are	available	at	a	rate	25	bps	below	the	REFI	of	-0.5%.
3.	This	comprises	the	additional	envelope	of	the	Asset	Purchase	Programme	(APP)	of	€120	billion	adopted	in	March	2020	and	the	Pandemic	Emergency	Purchase
Programme	(PEPP)	with	an	envelope	of	€1,350	billion	adopted	in	June	2020	(including	an	initial	envelope	of	€750	billion	adopted	in	March).	Both	are	assumed	to	be
extended	by	another	year	to	a	total	of	€2,940	billion	or	24.6%	of	2019	GDP.
4.	Estimates	based	on	data	from	Bruegel	with	some	modifications.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	European	Council
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